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To gain an overall picture of the role of the various sources that play a part in
human development, it is surely in order to abstract from the intricate relations between
genes, experience, and the environment. And surely there is no reason to suppose that
one cannot learn something by using simplified models. Using an additivity model in a
case where one knows that reality is interactive and complex (e.g., when the genesis of
specific mental traits are at issue), one can still get a clue whether a particular variable
makes a difference in a population and estimate the sence of its importance.
But, as I argued in my paper, it is quite another thing to make causal inferences,
such as saying that genes and the unshared environment are largely responsible for the
enduring features of our mental life, such as intelligence, personality, one’s likes and
dislikes, while the shared environment has hardly any causal effect on these traits. These
conclusions, so I argued, are one station too far. It seems to me that making those infer-
ences does require extra assumptions, and if these are not provided or are unavailable,
one must settle for less grandiose conclusions.
Turkheimer and Waldron seem to agree, or don’t they? They acknowledge that
correlational statistical methods, as such, do not bear developmental conclusions. But
they see this as a truth, which applies to all correlation-based studies. According to
them, there is no difference between behavioral genetics use of the ANOVA method and
its use in developmental psychology or any other field. So they object to my addressing
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my criticism solely to the already much-plagued behavior geneticist. I think, however,
that behavior genetics is a special case, and will try to spell out why I think so.
Turkheimer and Waldron appear to think that the relationship between correla-
tional data and causal claims is fundamentally mysterious, at least in interesting and
complex cases. They suggest that one should leave this matter as it is, which seems to
imply that there is no answer anyway, adding that they and – indeed – I myself do not
have an answer. I don’t agree. The philosophical question of causality may be mysteri-
ous, but I do not think that the empirical issues related to correlation and causality are of
this kind. On the contrary! Indeed, the section in my paper entitled ‘Relating Variance
and Development’ is about that relationship. I shall restate the crux of my paper in this
reply before turning to their remarks. I will conclude by briefly paying attention to
Wahlsten’s comments, which I take as a further confirmation of the concerns expressed
in my paper.
My paper essentially addresses the role of the additivity assumption in behavior
genetics. This assumption figures as a model which functions in connecting data with
reality, or rather is taken as such. The additivity assumption says basically that genes
and the environment can be seen as separately contributing to behavior. Both material
and statistical claims support this assumption. These different types of claims are con-
ceived as matching, that is, as mutually supportive, or at least as noncontradictory.
Now, because those claims are held to match, the variables in behavior genetic research
(genes, environment) can be seen as somehow representing material substances and thus
be the proper element for entering a causal relationship. This would then allow the
behavior geneticist to interpret data about variation in terms of causal effects (provided
of course that limitations of method and design are reckoned with). What breeds trouble
is the fact that the additivity model can hardly be seen as one that depicts the actual
relationship between genes and the environment. In the study of humans, the notions of
genes and of the environment can only function as abstract concepts that do not pick out
content in a univocal way. And as animal studies indicate, the genes and the environ-
ment are – in a complex way – interdependent. These problems for the additivity model
give rise to the question in what way the quantitative data of behavior genetics are to be
interpreted in material (causal) terms.
Notice, however, that I did not conclude that these problems are ‘nails in the coffin’
of behavior genetics, as some critics would have it. Instead I argued that those problems
can be seen as ones of interpretation. Moreover, I observed that most behavior geneti-
cists do somehow accept the premises of this conclusion, even though they do not spend
much time in seeking resolutions. Maybe they think, with Turkheimer and Waldron,
that there are no answers to be found. Or perhaps they simply suspect interpretation. In
the section of my paper ‘Relating Variance and Development’, I seek to find ways for
dealing with the issue of interpretation. I envisage two types of directions to be taken.
One actually shifts the interpretative issue (somewhat) to the background. According to
this prospect, one should seek forms of statistical analysis that do match the material
relation between genes and the environment, and which by that token would allow for
developmental conclusions. The other, presumably more realistic, option is one of arti-
culating an interpretive device that allows for translating variance in terms of develop-
ment.
With this elucidation in mind, I can answer Turkheimer and Waldron’s question of
why I address my criticism of the causal use of ANOVA solely to behavior genetics
research. I do not think the problem of relating variance and development applies ex-
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clusively in the context of behavior genetics. But I do hold that behavior genetics is a
special case. This is so because the additivity model is to a large extent founded upon
correlation based statistics. In this sense ANOVA is not just another tool, it is part of the
theoretical foundation of behavior genetics. This is generally not the case in develop-
mental psychology or any other field, which usually utilizes separate causal theories as
models to relate data and reality. However, note that in cases of absence of causal mod-
els to match a research design, causal inferences are usually seen as problematic, and
rightly so! Non-experimental research may document that people who are fond of spi-
nach live longer compared to people that never eat spinach, but does this allow for the
conclusion that eating spinach makes one live longer? Who would not think that this is a
hasty conclusion, much in need of empirical confirmation of a different kind? If on the
other hand one starts from a (causal) model, things tend to be different. A researcher
may predict that the emotional responsiveness of mothers toward their children leads to
a secure attachment relation, for reasons that are clearly specified in a theory. In this
case the model allows one to interpret correlations between responsiveness and secure
attachment in causal terms. Of course, the model might be false, but it does offer further
reasons, which are, or at least could be, of an empirical kind.
I turn now to the paper by Wahlsten. Wahlsten’s paper is largely in support of my
main thesis, that there is a gap between the assumptions that are basic to behavior
genetics (the additivity model) and the reality that it is supposed to map (which is gener-
ally seen as interactive). Wahlsten offers important further reasons for holding on to this
thesis. He points out in some detail how it is possible to partition variance in many
situations ‘even though the antecedent causes do not act separately during development’
(Wahlsten, this issue). Wahlsten furthermore suggests in what way we might be able to
map – with the aid of the ANOVA method – the interplay between genetic factors and
the environment. His suggestion, however, does not offer much comfort for human
behavior genetics, for Wahlsten holds that an experimental design is mandatory and
adds a number of conditions related to sample size. Without the possibility to identify
genes, however, there is no way to conform to these requirements. I can only add that in
the meantime we should at least seek an interpretative device that helps close the gap
between variance and development.

